In the Netherlands, three commercial poultry farms and two hobby holdings were infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N6 virus in the winter of 2017-2018. This H5N6 virus is a reassortant of HPAI H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses detected in Eurasia in 2016. H5N6 viruses were also detected in several dead wild birds during the winter. However, wild bird mortality was limited compared to the caused by the H5N8 group B virus in 2016-2017. H5N6 virus was not detected in wild birds after March, but in late summer infected wild birds were found again. In this study, the complete genome sequences of poultry and wild bird viruses were determined to study their genetic relationship. Genetic analysis showed that the outbreaks in poultry were not the result of farm-to-farm transmissions, but rather resulted from separate introductions from wild birds. Wild birds infected with viruses related to the first outbreak in poultry were found at short distances from the farm, within a short time frame. However, no wild bird viruses related to outbreaks 2 and 3 were detected.
H5 viruses of different neuraminidase (NA) subtypes (Lee, Bertran, Kwon, & Swayne, 2017) . Of these reassortant viruses, the clade 2.3.4.4 H5 viruses further evolved into four genetic groups, named A to D (Lee et al., 2016) . Outbreaks in poultry in the Netherlands were caused by H5N8 group A viruses in 2014 , and H5N8 group B viruses in 2016 . In December 2017, an outbreak of HPAI H5N6 was detected on a commercial poultry farm in the Netherlands.
We recently showed that this virus is a novel reassortant of the H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 group B viruses (Beerens et al., 2018) , which were first detected at the Russia-Mongolia border in May 2016. The H5N6 virus obtained novel polymerase basic 2 (PB2) and NA segments derived from Eurasian low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. After the first outbreak in poultry, H5N6 viruses were detected on two additional commercial poultry farms and two hobby holdings between December 2017 and March 2018. In this period, H5N6 virus was also detected in several dead wild birds that were tested in the passive wild bird surveillance programme in the Netherlands. Infected wild birds were also found in several other European countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Slovakia) .
Wild bird mortality caused by H5N6 viruses was limited compared to that observed during the H5N8 epidemic in in 2014, no dead wild birds infected with the H5N8 group A virus were detected. These observations suggest striking differences in the pathogenicity of these HPAI H5 viruses in wild birds.
After March 2018, the virus was not detected in wild birds or poultry in the Netherlands for several months. However, in August two dead wild birds infected with H5N6 virus were found again.
Detection of the virus in late summer suggests long-term circulation of H5N6 viruses in the local wild bird population. Alternatively, it may be a novel incursion of H5N6 virus due to the start of fall migration of wild birds to Europe. In this study, we analysed the genetic relationship between the viruses isolated from poultry and wild birds. This analysis will provide insight in whether the farms were infected by farm-to-farm transmission, or by separate introductions from wild birds. In addition, the analysis will provide insight in the origin of the H5N6 virus that was detected in a wild bird in late summer. Finally, the pathogenicity of the H5N6 virus in ducks was compared to that of the H5N8 viruses that caused epidemics in 2014 and 2016. These combined results will provide more insight in the HPAI H5N6 epidemic, which affected both wild birds and poultry in the Netherlands in 2017-2018.
| ME THODS

| Virus detection and subtyping
Viral RNA was extracted from tracheal or cloacal swabs from dead wild birds using the MagNa Pure 96 (Roche). For commercial poultry farms, pools of five samples from clinically affected chickens or ducks were used. Tracheal and cloacal swabs were pooled separately.
The samples were tested in a matrix gene real-time PCR, which detects all avian influenza (AI) virus subtypes, as described previously . The positive samples were then subtyped using a H5-specific real-time PCR (Slomka et al., 2007) , as recommended by the European Union reference laboratory. The sequence of the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site and the NA subtype was determined by Sanger sequencing (Beerens et al., 2018) .
| Complete genome sequencing and analysis
Viral RNA was purified using the High Pure Viral RNA kit (Roche), and amplified using universal eight-segment primers and directly sequenced, as described previously .
Briefly, purified amplicons were sequenced at high coverage (average >1000 per nucleotide position) using the Nextera library preparation method and Illumina MiSeq paired-end 150 base pairs sequencing. Quality control-passed sequence reads were mapped using the ViralProfiler-Workflow, an extension of the CLC Genomics Workbench (Qiagen, Germany), as previously described . The consensus sequences generated in this study were submitted to the GISAID database. The GISAID accession numbers are listed in Table 1 .
| Phylogenetic network
The eight-gene-segment alignments were manually concatenated to generate a single alignment that was used to construct phylogenetic networks using the median-joining method implemented in the program NETWORK, as described previously (Bataille, van der Meer, Stegeman, & Koch, 2011) . This model-free method uses a parsimony approach based on pairwise differences to connect each sequence to its closest neighbour, and allows creation of internal nodes ('median vectors'), which could be interpreted as unsampled or extinct ancestral genotypes to link the existing genotypes in the most parsimonious way (Bandelt, Yao, Bravi, Salas, & Kivisild, 2009 ). In the analysis, we also included sequences from three wild bird viruses that were isolated in research programmes in the Netherlands (NL1-3); however, a forth sequence was excluded because of a reassortment of the polymerase acidic (PA)gene segment. The sequences of publically available Dutch and European sequences that were used in this study are listed in Table 1 . according to the standard procedure (OIE, 2015) . Ten 6-week-old Pekin ducks were purchased from a commercial breeder. The animals were tested for the absence of antibodies against AI using ELISA (Influenza Ab Test kit, IDEXX Laboratories). After intravenous inoculation, the ducks were monitored for clinical signs and mortality for 10 days. The experiment was performed in biosecurity level-3 facilities, under the approval of the Central Animal Experiments Committee (licence number 2017.D-0054.001) in the Netherlands. Sequences generated in a previous study, see reference (8). b We acknowledge the authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from GISAID's EpiFlu™ Database on which this research is based. All submitters of data may be contacted directly via the GISAID website www.gisaid.org.
| IVPI in ducks
TA B L E 1 GISAID accession numbers of the sequences generated or used in this study
Isolate
| RE SULTS
| Detection of HPAI H5N6 in poultry and wild birds
The first introduction of HPAI H5N6 into a commercial poultry holding was detected on an indoor farm with meat ducks on 7
December 2017, in the municipality of Biddinghuizen. The farm was located near a lake in the central part of the Netherlands, In the passive wild bird surveillance programme, diagnostic testing for AI is performed for wild birds found dead. Between 1 November 2017 and 1 April 2018, 281 dead birds were tested, of which 13 birds tested positive for HPAI H5N6 (Table 2) .
Early in the epidemic, mostly birds of the family Anatidae 
| Genetic analysis of the H5N6 epidemic
We previously determined the complete genome sequences of HPAI H5N6 viruses isolated from the first outbreak on the commercial poultry in Biddinghuizen and three wild birds (wb 1-3, Table 2) found dead nearby this farm (Beerens et al., 2018 ). In the current study, we performed deep sequencing to determine the complete genome sequences of H5N6 viruses that were detected later in 2017-2018 in commercial and hobby poultry holdings, and in dead wild birds.
To analyse the genetic relationship between viruses isolated from commercial poultry, a median-joining network analysis was performed ( Figure 2 ). We identified 47 nucleotide differences between the genomes of the viruses detected at the farm in Biddinghuizen Therefore, likely the farms were infected by separate introductions from wild birds.
The genetic relationship between H5N6 viruses isolated from poultry and wild birds was also studied. In this network analysis, we included publically available sequences of other European H5N6 virus isolates (Table 1 ). The analysis identified several wild bird viruses related to the virus isolated from the farm in Biddinghuizen (Figure 3) . The genetically most closely related wild bird virus (wb 2) contained eight nucleotide differences, and was isolated from a tufted duck. This dead bird was found 2 days after detection of the virus at the farm (distance 9 km) ( Table 3) . Two mute swans (wb 1 and 3) that were found dead in the central lake area near Biddinghuizen on the same day also carried highly similar viruses.
For the two hobby holding, viruses isolated from three different poultry species were sequenced (Table 1 ). These sequences differed by one or two nucleotides within one holding (Figure 3 , HBH1-3 and HR1-3). The viruses isolated from the hobby holdings are also found in the cluster of viruses related to the commercial poultry farm in
Biddinghuizen. This cluster also contains viruses detected later in winter 2017-2018, at longer distances from the farm ( 
| Pathogenicity of the H5N6 virus
The pathogenicity of the H5N6 virus was determined in Pekin ducks, and compared to that of the H5N8 viruses detected in the Netherlands in 2014 and 2016. For this experiment, the viruses isolated from the index cases in poultry were used. We infected 10 ducks This resulted in an IVPI score of 3.0 for both viruses (Figure 4a,b) .
For the H5N8 2014 virus, four ducks survived the 10 days of the experiment, resulting in an IVPI score of 1.9 (Figure 4c ). The reduced pathogenicity index of the H5N8 2014 virus correlates with the absence of wild bird mortality during this epidemic. Surprisingly, the IVPI scores of H5N6 and H5N8 2016 viruses measured in ducks were equal, whereas only for H5N8 massive wild bird mortality was observed during the epidemic in 2016-2017.
| D ISCUSS I ON
In December 2017, the Netherlands was first to report HPAI H5N6
in Europe (Beerens et al., 2018) . Later in 2017-2018, the H5N6 virus was also detected in wild birds in several other European countries.
In the Netherlands, three commercial poultry farms and two hobby holdings were infected with H5N6 viruses. H5N6 viruses were detected in 15 dead wild birds tested in the passive wild bird surveillance programme. We previously showed that this virus is a novel Table 1 , which also provides the GISAID accession numbers (Beerens et al., 2018) . Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that the virus is not related to the H5N6 virus detected in Greece in February 2017, as it carries genetically different PA and PB2 gene segments.
The virus is also distinct from the zoonotic Asian H5N6 strains that caused infections in humans. There are currently no human cases associated with this novel H5N6 reassortant virus.
In this study, the complete genome sequences of the H5N6 viruses isolated in the Netherlands were determined to study their genetic relationship. The genomes of the viruses isolated from the three commercial poultry farms differed at a large number of nucleotide positions, resulting in several amino acid changes. This demonstrates that the viruses on the three farms were genetically not closely related, and infection likely resulted from separate introductions from wild birds. This is further supported by the epidemiological investigation, which revealed no links between the poultry farms. Directly after testing positive for H5 virus, poultry was culled and restriction and protection zones were established.
These measures were effective to prevent spread of the virus. The results emphasize the need for poultry farmers to prevent direct or indirect contact between poultry and wild birds by strictly following hygienic measures and biosecurity protocols. The route of introduction of the virus into the three indoor poultry houses was not identified, but among others, contaminated persons, materials or vectors (e.g. rodents, insects) may have introduced the virus into the farm. However, no wild bird viruses genetically related to outbreaks 2 and 3 were isolated. Late in summer, two wild birds found dead in the central lake area of the Netherlands tested positive for HPAI H5N6.
Genetic analysis showed that this "late" virus shares a common ancestor with the virus detected in outbreak 1, although these viruses differ at 57 nucleotide positions. As this virus was detected almost 9 months after outbreak 1, this suggests a nucleotide substitution rate of around 5.7 × 10 −3 substitutions/site/year. This calculated substitution rate is within the range previously estimated for HPAI H5 viruses (Fourment & Holmes, 2015; Rejmanek, Hosseini, Mazet, Daszak, & Goldstein, 2015) . This suggests that the virus most likely mortality was observed in the wild bird population. We previously showed that the pathogenicity of the three viruses for galliform birds was similar, for all viruses an IVPI score of 3.0 was measured (Beerens et al., , 2018 . In this study, we performed an IVPI experiment using ducks. We show that the H5N8 2014 virus is less pathogenic in ducks, as a score of 1.9 was measured. Surprisingly, for both group B viruses an IVPI score of 3.0
was measured in ducks. The virus was inoculated intravenously in this experiment, whereas natural infection occurs via the respiratory route. Previous studies showed that the observed pathogenicity of HPAI H5N1 was independent of the route of inoculation (Pantin-Jackwood, Swayne, Smith, & Shepherd, 2013). However, potential differences in virus attachment and entry via the respiratory tract are not assessed in this experiment. Sequence analysis shows that the HA proteins of the two group B viruses differ at only four positions (results not shown). For these positions, no functional role has been described, which suggests a similar entry efficiency for both viruses. The H5N8 group A and group B viruses differ at numerous amino acid positions in the HA gene .
The IVPI experiment was performed using Pekin ducks, which is a domestic duck breed derived from the mallard. Therefore, we expect a similar pathogenicity in the wild mallard, although this may differ for other species of water birds (van den Brand et al., 2018) .
The fact that no difference in pathogenicity was measured for the two group B viruses in ducks may suggest that biological or ecolog- prey were infected (Kleyheeg et al., 2017) . These predators were most likely infected by feeding on infected preys. During the H5N6 epidemic, the virus was mainly detected in residential birds (mute swans), and later again in birds of prey. Furthermore, genetic analysis provided indications for long-term circulation of H5N6 viruses in the local wild bird population. These observations suggest different infection dynamics for the H5N6 and H5N8 group B viruses in the wild bird population in the Netherlands.
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